Financial and capital account liberalisation, financial development and economic development: a review of some recent contributions by Botta, Alberto
Financial and Capital Account Liberalization, 
Financial Development and Economic 
Development: A Review of Some Recent 
Contributions
Alberto Botta
Department of International Business and Economics, University of 
Greenwich, London, England
Abstract This article presents a review of some recent contributions on the relation 
between global finance and economic development in emerging economies. It first, 
stresses the growing consensus among economists on the financial instability that 
financial and capital account liberalization can possibly cause in emerging economies. 
It then outlines and compares two alternative strategies to tame such instability. The 
comparison is between the “good-institutions need-to-come-first” approach put 
forward by some mainstream economists, and the request for a deeper reform of the 
existing monetary system advocated by heterodox economists.
Keywords: financial liberalization, capital account liberalization, financial crises, 
global economic governance
1. INTRODUCTION
Summer 2017 marks the 10-year anniversary of the outbreak of the financial crisis. 
Twenty years ago, the East Asian financial crisis got the headlines of most news-
papers worldwide. Meanwhile, financial and economic crises also hit many other 
emerging economies, Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Turkey to say a few.
The fact that financial crises could hit emerging and developing countries comes 
as no surprise to the mainstream economists criticizing financial repression, and 
supporting financial and capital account liberalization as beneficial for economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability. A cornerstone of the so-called “financial 
repression” theory is the idea that financial repression implemented by the national 
governments in developing countries is the main cause of macroeconomic vulnera-
bility, banks’ fragility, and ultimately the disarray of the financial system as a whole. 
This is also a rather standard interpretation of the debt crisis of Latin American and 
African countries at the beginning of the 1980s. Nonetheless, it is quite hard to agree 
with this view when we consider the East Asian and sub-prime crises mentioned 
above. On the one hand, the East Asian financial crisis hit some economies that 
had been generally considered as world-wide examples of good macroeconomic 
management, if not economic miracles. Interestingly, at the beginning of the 1990s, 
such economies adopted those very same financial liberalization policies advocated 
by international economic institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) and neoliberal 
economists as necessary in order to favour financial development and spur economic 
growth. On the other hand, the sub-prime crisis started in the USA, i.e. the finan-
cial centre of the world and the economy with the most developed, sophisticated, 
complete and liquid financial system worldwide.
These events have effectively reinforced the conviction that the relation between 
financial and capital account liberalization, financial development and economic 
development should be reconsidered. Such a review has conducted to a “soft” 
revision, but also to an even deeper critique from heterodox standpoints, of the 
neoliberal consensus about the desirability of financial liberalization. As to the 
soft revision, it maintains that financial liberalization and the opening of the cap-
ital account can ultimately accelerate economic growth and prompt a more solid 
macroeconomic environment. The secret to reap these gains lies in the sequence, 
timing and gradualness with which such reforms are implemented. In order to pay 
off, financial and capital account liberalization need to be carried out along with 
a proper supervisory regulation of financial operators avoiding them from taking 
too risky moral hazard behaviours. As to the latter, the abovementioned examples 
of financial crises constitute even clearer proofs that financial and capital account 
liberalization, as well as financial innovations, are intrinsically destabilizing. They 
are sources of boom-and-bust cycles no matter how accurate and elaborated is 
micro-prudential supervision of financial systems. The solution to these problems 
is to be found not in the regulation, but rather in the strict impediments to certain 
types of capital flows and financial practices/instruments. Such impediments should 
constitute part of macro-prudential activities that constantly tame the unstable pro-
cesses endogenously created by financial dynamics.
In this article, we propose a review of such opposing perspectives on the basis 
of some recent contributions on the more general topic of global finance and eco-
nomic development. In particular, we refer to the contributions by Akyüz (2014); 
Knoop (2013)), as well as to the two books edited by Ülgen (2017a); Wolfson and  
Epstein (2013), respectively. The article is organized as follows. The next section 
describes the logic of the “financial repression” theory, and hence the rationale 
behind the economic proposals asking for the liberalization of financial markets 
and capital flows. We then move to the critiques to this neoliberal paradigm. We 
first, present the “soft” revision of the above point as supported by Knoop (2013). 
We then analyse the much more radical critique to the “financial package” of the 
standard neoliberal policy agenda put forward by Akyüz (2014). Emphasis here is 
on developing countries and the several difficulties they find in implementing coun-
ter-cyclical policies once capital accounts and financial flows have been liberalized. 
Such review article concludes by considering the systemic criticism of modern 
financialized capitalist economies contained in the book edited by Ülgen (2017b). 
We also discuss the quest for a radical reform of the governance of world financial 
flows, and of the ensuing global imbalances (Balance of Payments (BoP) imbalances 
hereinafter), as advocated by several contributions contained in the Handbook of 
the Political Economy of Financial Crises edited by Wolfson and Epstein (2013).
2. THE SHAKY THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
“FINANCIAL REPRESSION” THEORY AND OF NEOLIBERAL-TYPE 
FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION POLICIES
The simplest way to understand the economic rationale of the neoliberal critique 
to “financial repression”, and the ensuing support to financial liberalization, is the 
well-known graph showing the supply and demand for loanable funds (see Figure 1).
Let us assume that rd is the interest rate paid on deposits by banks, whilst “r” is 
the interest rate effectively levied on loans to firms. “m” stands for the additional 
information and monitoring costs (on top of the interest rate rd) banks have to 
support in connection to their intermediation activity. “m” also takes into account 
the degree of monopoly power characterizing the banking sector. The supply of 
funds is upward sloped with respect to the interest rate r. The demand of funds is 
downward sloped in the (r–I) space.
Now assume that the national government heavily restricts the operativeness 
of the financial system by imposing a ceiling rC to the interest rate levied on inter-
mediated funds. As a consequence, banks collect funds in an amount equal to S, 
and finance investment projects in an amount equal to I. A considerable amount of 
additional investment (Ī–I) possibly undertaken at the forcedly low interest rate rC is 
not financed due to lack of savings. In the end, the “short side of the market” binds 
financeable projects. On top of such a “quantitative” outcome of governmentally 
imposed financial repression, also undesirable “qualitative” effects must be taken 
into account. Indeed, a few amount of poorly remunerative investment projects 
are financed, whilst many more remunerative entrepreneurial initiatives (I*–I) are 
eventually cut-off. This investment would otherwise have been financed under free 
market mechanisms (see point B in Figure 1). Such a distorted and inefficient allo-
cation of loanable funds would be even exacerbated in presence of “direct credit 
policies” diverting funds away from private sector investment towards inefficient 
and poorly remunerative (due to the lack of a strong incentive for profitability) 
state-owned firms.
Now assume that the domestic financial sector is liberalized and any repressive 
policy removed. Free market mechanisms naturally bring the economy from point 
A to point B, with a clear increase in household savings (from S to S*), interme-
diated funds, and financed investment (from I to I*). In the case of developing 
countries, the opening of the domestic financial sector to foreign competition and 
foreign financial flows can also contribute to significantly improve the efficiency 
of the financial sector (through the adoption of international best practices) and 
discard any dominant position (by increasing competitive pressures). A reduction 
in the mark-up rate from m1 to m2 ensues. Accordingly, the supply schedule moves 
downwards, prompting a further increase in intermediated funds (S**) and financed 
investment (I**).
The story narrated by the supporters of financial liberalization is simple and 
catchy, but affected by two relevant flaws. First, following Akyüz (2014), stand-
ard mainstream theory often neglects that households, i.e. saving institutions par 
Figure 1: The Market for Loanable Funds in the Mainstream Theory.
excellence in economic models, usually hold credits and debts at the same time. 
Consequently, households’ reaction to financial liberalization and increases in inter-
est rates may well go counter to what expected. Savings could actually fall rather 
than increase after financial liberalization, so that financial liberalization could not 
bring any positive effect on the volume of intermediated loans. Second, and perhaps 
more relevantly, mainstream theory usually takes financial operators as performing 
a pure function of intermediation between final savers and final investors. This 
way, it leaves banks’ credit out of the picture. It does not appropriately consider 
the capacity of the banking system to create purchasing power ex nihilo rather than 
simply transferring it from creditors to debtors. The existing empirical evidence tells 
us that financial and capital account liberalization significantly influences economic 
dynamics through credit availability, i.e. by affecting the willingness of the banking 
sector, and financial markets more in general, to create credit for both domestic and 
foreign actors. When the role of credit creation and of its pro-cyclical evolution are 
appropriately taken into account in describing macroeconomic dynamics emerging 
out of financial liberalization, also the dangers set by financial liberalization itself 
to macroeconomic stability appear clearly.
2.1. Financial Liberalization and Macroeconomic Instability: Are 
Gradualism And Good Institutions The Right Remedy?
After almost 40 years of financial and capital account liberalization in both devel-
oped and developing countries, there seems to be a solid empirical evidence that 
financial crises have become much more frequent in the aftermath of such reforms. 
Knoop (2013) cites a previous paper by Kaminsky and Reinhart, and notes that “in 
26 banking crisis episodes, 18 of them occurred within five years of significant 
financial liberalization (Knoop, 2013, p. 94)”. Knopp also stresses that “in countries 
where financial liberalization has recently taken place and where there existed high 
pre-crisis levels of credit growth and low levels of bank capitals, banking crises 
were significantly more likely to occur (Knoop, 2013, p. 84)”. The reason for such 
financial liberalization-led instability lies “in the role that financial liberalization 
plays in freeing banks to engage in riskier behaviour. This can encourage moral 
hazard lending and a rapid expansion in credit and leverage. Much of this credit 
gets funnelled into asset markets, creating debt-fuelled price booms (Knoop, 2013, 
p. 85)”. Bank crises and asset markets boom-and-bust seem to be tightly connected, 
since “stock and housing bubbles consistently precede banking crises in both devel-
oped and emerging economies (Knoop, 2013, p. 94”).
Financial instability is even exacerbated when domestic financial liberalization is 
carried out together with capital account liberalization. Indeed, freeing capital flows 
allows (rampant) foreign capitals to take part in asset booms following domestic 
financial liberalization, thus making booms and the ensuing collapses even more 
pronounced. Also, domestic banks can get easier access to cheap international loans 
to then finance strong expansions in domestic credit. Such a connection between 
foreign debt and domestic credit exposes the domestic financial sector to dangerous 
exchange rate mismatching, as well as to the volatility of external financing. The 
whole domestic economy eventually gets much more vulnerable to external shocks. 
It is not by chance that “booms in external debt levels consistently precede banking 
crises as part of the overall boom in credit (Knoop, 2013, p. 94)”.
The tight connection between domestic and external financial liberalization and 
financial crises casts serious doubts on the alleged ability of financial liberalization 
to favour financial development and thus economic development. This holds in 
particular if one takes into account the high real-side costs, i.e. overall economic 
contraction, lower or stagnant investment, dramatic job losses and high unemploy-
ment levels, usually associated to financial shocks.
These facts notwithstanding, several mainstream economists still maintain that 
financial liberalization is potentially beneficial. According to them, it is not financial 
liberalization in itself to set risks for macroeconomic stability, but the way such 
reforms are implemented. This is the logic embraced by Todd Knoop. In his words, 
“indiscriminant and rushed [italics is mine] financial liberalization has repeatedly 
led to asset bubbles and banking crises throughout the world over the last 30 years 
(Knoop, 2013, p. 110)”. This has happened because “financial liberalization can only 
increase growth when the microeconomic [italics is mine] fundamentals for solid 
growth are already in place (Knoop, 2013, p. 111)”. In turn, such microeconomic 
fundamentals mainly consist in good institutions and high-quality governance in 
the form of well-developed prudential regulation; rules of the game encouraging 
competition; well-developed legislation ensuring property rights, favouring quick 
resolutions of legal conflicts and avoiding corruption; macro-policy rules favouring 
macroeconomic stability (i.e. central bank commitment to low inflation and fiscal 
rules impeding governments to run unsustainable fiscal deficits). In Knoop’s own 
words, “without institutions such as prudential regulations in place, there is no 
reason to think that liberalization will increase growth […]. Capital account liberal-
ization is beneficial for growth only when good institutions and quality governance 
are first in place [and] the impact of liberalization depends crucially upon how it is 
sequenced (Knoop, 2013, pp. 112, 113)”.
Knoop proposes financial liberalization to be included in a wider set of reforms 
staged in the following way:
(1)  The liberalization of the domestic good market comes first, including the open-
ing of the home economy to international trade
(2)  The second step to adopt is macroeconomic stability. This implies low inflation 
and consequently the avoidance of large fiscal deficits that could be eventually
monetized under pressures by national governments on the domestic central 
bank. From an institutional point of view, the corollaries of macroeconomic 
stability are the adoption of an inflation targeting monetary policy rule; of an 
independent central bank; of a fiscal policy rule binding domestic governments 
to balanced fiscal budget (at least in the medium run)
(3)  The next step is micro-prudential regulation, particularly in the form of capital
adequacy ratios imposed to banks, and restrictions to moral hazard lending.
When prudential regulation is in place, domestic authorities can then proceed to 
liberalize domestic financial systems (i.e. deregulate bonds and stock markets
and privatize state-own banks)
(4)  The final step is capital account liberalization, which should be staged in such a 
way that long-term foreign direct investment is liberalized first and short-term
portfolio investment as the last.
Interestingly, Knoop interprets some of the most recent financial crises hitting
emerging economics as due to the lack of one or more of these preconditions. In 
the case of the 1994 “Tequila crisis” in Mexico, most of the problems lied in a 
process of privatization of domestic banks actuated too rapidly without introducing 
adequate anti-corruption, pro-competition, and micro-prudential regulations. At 
the beginning of the 90s, Mexican “privatization took place rapidly and without 
sufficient transparency to prevent corruption […]. Significant barriers to entry were 
not removed…so that state-owned banking monopolies were replaced with privately 
owned banking monopolies […]. Most importantly, little prudential regulation was 
put in place to moderate banks’ behaviour once they were deregulated. Bank capital 
requirements were lower than international standards and connected lending and 
corruption were rampant (Knoop, 2013, pp. 95, 96)”.
Knoop provides the same explanation for the East Asian crisis. Despite quite 
good macroeconomic fundamentals, such as low inflation and low budget defi-
cits, the banking systems of those economies were exposed to significant currency 
mismatch, and, even more importantly, they were weakly and badly supervised: 
“Despite dangerous levels of currency mismatch, a banking crisis in East Asia was 
not inevitable if the banking system in the region had been making profitable loans 
and held fundamentally valuable assets. Unfortunately, this was not the case, as loan 
quality was extremely weak because of the extensive problem of moral hazard […]. 
Moral hazard was largely unchecked by prudential regulation after the financial 
deregulation of the 1980s […]. One final source of moral hazard in East Asia was 
the belief among banks that any large losses they incurred would eventually be 
assumed by the government in a bailout (Knoop, 2013, pp. 150, 151)”.
Last, in the case of the 2001 Argentinian crisis, Argentinian institutions did well 
both in terms of restoration of inflation control (after a period of hyper-inflation) 
through the adoption of a currency board exchange regime, as well as of supervision 
and regulation of the banking system. Here, the missing requirements (for successful 
liberalization) were efficient and competitive good and labour markets, and, more 
importantly, a disciplined fiscal policy:
There were three significant problems with this ‘Argentinian miracle’ of the 1990s. The 
first is that within this strong system of prudential regulation there were few restrictions on 
dollar-denominated debt […]. The second problem was Argentina’s lack of fiscal discipline 
[…]. The third problem was the general microeconomic inefficiency of Argentinian labour 
and product markets (Knoop, 2013, p. 134).
In Knoop’s view, the persistence of inefficient and inflexible labour and good 
markets was inconsistent with the adoption of a currency board. Indeed, a hard peg 
exchange rate regime would have required extremely flexible prices and wages 
accommodating any external shock through internal nominal adjustments. On top 
of this, excessive government borrowing made the exchange rate peg and the central 
bank commitment against inflation poorly credible:
A currency board could never work in Argentina given their dysfunctional institutions and 
their inability to play by the rules. Outright dollarization would have been a better option if 
Argentina was truly committed to stabilizing inflation and promoting economic integration 
with the rest of the world, as it would have taken monetary policy entirely out of the hands 
of Argentinian government (Knoop, 2013, p. 136).
3. THE INTRINSIC INSTABILITY OF FINANCIAL DYNAMICS AND
CAPITAL FLOWS: THE QUEST FOR DEFINANCIALIZATION
There is a series of contradictions in Knoop’s arguments, as well as in the more 
general view that good institutions and quality governance are necessary and suf-
ficient (pre-) requirements for successful financial liberalization. First, some of 
the prudential regulations Knoop is advocating effectively amount to restrictions 
to capital flows and to the free behaviour of deregulated financial institutions. This 
is the case of limits to the accumulation of foreign currency denominated debt. In 
the end, and perhaps paradoxically, it seems mainstream economists ask for wide 
financial liberalization on the one hand, but they also demand for regulatory meas-
ures that would impede full financial liberalization on the other. Second, lack of 
fiscal discipline by domestic governments does not seem to be a primary source of 
financial disruption. Knoop himself notes that “banking crises cause sovereign debt 
crises, but not vice versa (Knoop, 2013, p. 94)”. Indeed, empirical evidence shows 
that financial crises took place even when public budgets were well managed and 
under control. Rather, it was the private sector to be the leading source of financial 
instability. Third, Wolfson (2013) reports a long list of bank and asset market col-
lapses, possibly causing systemic crashes, taking place even in the worldwide most 
developed US financial system since the end of the 1970s. Interestingly, Wolfson 
(2013) notes how these crises are significantly different from the typical Minskian 
financial disturbances characterizing the golden age of capitalism, which were 
less frequent, less severe and generally associated to the peak of the real business 
cycle. Also, it is worth noting that the new financial instruments and institutions, 
which contributed to spread the last sub-prime crisis and make it a systemic shock, 
were initially conceived as safe products/institutions, functional to improving the 
operativeness of the financial system. This is the case of securitization and collat-
eralized debt obligations (CDOs) transforming high risky mortgages in investment 
grade assets. This is also the case of credit default swaps (CDS) providing private 
insurance against defaults events, or repurchase agreements (REPOs), i.e. secure 
collateralized lending. Finally, the same can be said about money market mutual 
funds’ shares, which were considered as more remunerative substitutes for bank 
deposits.
Following Arestis (2017), all the above observations are in line with the Minskian 
“theory of endogenous financial instability, which can explain the tendency of the 
financial system to generate crises as part of its ‘normal’ functioning (Arestis, 2017, 
p. 23)”. Also, they are in line with Kindleberger’s view that (endogenous) financial
innovations are the ultimate sources of destabilizing asset bubbles, and that they can 
hardly be prevented by any micro-prudential regulation (see Knoop, 2013). Indeed, 
following Ülgen (2017b): “in liberalised and innovative financial markets, complex 
interconnections are created among different institutions. These connections con-
tribute to the development of financial markets and give the impression of a greater
efficiency in the use of loanable funds, but at the same time they contain the seeds
of a contagion at systemic level, a contagion that is out of the reach of individuals
and financial institutions. [This is why] in liberalized market economies, there is no 
automatic bridge between micro-prudential behaviour and macroeconomic stability 
(Ülgen, 2017b, pp. 62–65)”.
Akyüz (2014) reframes these points in the context of emerging and developing 
countries whose capital accounts have been liberalized and opened to foreign capi-
tals. He criticizes the “weak institutions” interpretations of financial crises by noting 
that “financial openness tends to create systemic problems regardless [italics is 
mine] of the order in which various markets are liberalized and distortions removed 
(Akyüz, 2014, p. 39)”. This is why, even though prudential regulations and bank 
supervision are important to avoid moral hazard and financial instability, “measures 
such as capital requirements are not always enough to reduce financial fragility: 
it may also be necessary to act directly on the asset portfolio of banks and restrict 
lending against or investment in highly capital-uncertain assets, such as securities 
and property (Akyüz, 2014, p. 46)”. This is a clear quest for the reintroduction of 
much tougher and pervasive regulations and controls of financial operators, i.e. a 
return to some form of financial repression.
Akyüz (2014) provides at least four reasons to support the (re) introduction of 
restrictions, if not the complete ban of some forms of capital inflows, in particular 
in the case of emerging/developing countries.
(1)  Mainstream economists advocated the liberalization of developing countries’
capital accounts, and in particular the opening to foreign direct investment
(FDI), in order to increase available (domestic and foreign) savings and raise
investment. However, the empirical evidence about the alleged positive link
between surge in (liberalized) FDI and savings/investment is weak to say the
least. Most of the time, total savings did not grow at all. Foreign savings sim-
ply displaced domestic ones. On top of this, since the 1990s, Latin American
countries experienced considerable increases in net FDI, but gross fixed capital 
formation stagnated or even fell with respect to pre-crisis decades. The same
can be said for African countries. Only in rapidly growing East Asian newly
industrialized countries a positive relationship between FDI and investment
seems to exist. In the end, fiscal and monetary policies do emerge as the most
relevant determinants of investment decisions rather than capital account liber-
alization per se. On the one hand, capital accumulation seems to respond posi-
tively to monetary policies that keep interest rates relatively low, and maintain
the real exchange rate at a stable and competitive level. Similarly, investment
decisions seem to be positively affected by disciplined fiscal policies, which
nevertheless maintain high levels of public investment, and do not blindly pur-
sue austerity targets. On the other hand, restrictive monetary and fiscal policies 
can cause a significant slowdown in productive investment. Following Akyüz
(2014), restrictive policy stances have been often adopted in many emerging
economies in the aftermath of capital account liberalization in order to attract
foreign investment. Such policies certainly “played an important role in creating 
conditions favourable to asset acquisition but not to fixed capital formation [so
that the economy eventually experienced] strong surges in FDI but stagnant or
declining gross fixed capital formation (Akyüz, 2014, p. 87)”.
(2)  Financial and capital account liberalizations, and the ensuing initial booms
in capital inflows, are often the primary sources of boom-and bust cycles and
pronounced macroeconomic volatility. Indeed, capital flows are strongly pro-cy-
clical. According to Akyüz (2014), most international capital flows are portfolio 
investment characterized by short-term speculative purposes. They likely over-
flow in recently liberalized developing countries in order to exploit capital gain 
opportunities in the security market or in the real estate, or to take advantage 
of arbitrage opportunities linked to high interest rate differentials. This way, 
massive portfolio investment gives rise to credit booms and asset bubbles that 
come together with unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances: exchange rate 
appreciations, widening current account (CA) deficits, over-indebtedness on 
external financial markets and currency mismatch in the balance sheets of 
domestic banks and firms. When, sooner or later, booms end and bubbles burst, 
sudden stops and capital reversals of short-term portfolio investment trigger 
the crisis by inducing exchange rate gyrations and asset price collapses. In the 
case of developing countries such financial shocks eventually give rise to abrupt 
economic contractions.
(3)  Developing countries do not have margins of manoeuvre. They can hardly con-
trast the destabilizing forces of free capital flows with their own macroeconomic
policies. In the end, under full capital account openness, both monetary and
fiscal policies face relevant dilemmas, and turn out being pro-cyclical.
Monetary policy, for instance, may try to tame the initial foreign credit-led boom 
by increasing interest rates. But domestic interest rates persistently higher than for-
eign ones attract foreign capitals even further. Alternatively, domestic central banks 
can try to avoid the initial appreciation of the (real) exchange rate by intervening 
on the foreign currency market and piling up reserves. In doing this, however, they 
will allow for the expansion of domestic credit, hence, fueling the boom. Finally, 
the attempt to sterilize the newly created base money faces the risk of increasing 
the interest rate on government bonds, and putting the solidity of public budget 
under pressure.
In the case of fiscal policy, empirical evidence shows it often turns to be expan-
sionary when foreign capitals surge due to the attempt to take advantage of easy and 
cheap access to foreign lending. Nonetheless, when the crisis erupts, it turns into 
ultra-restrictive, thus strengthening deflationary pressures in the economy.
(4)  Last, the economic crashes following financial crises are particularly severe
and can last much longer than “normal” recessions associated to pure real busi-
ness cycles. Indeed, exchange rate and asset price collapses cause considerable 
financial disarray in the balance sheets of banks and non-financial firms. Banks 
try to deleverage and ration credits, this way jeopardizing new entrepreneurial
projects in search for external funding. Non-financial firms exploit recovery in
order to primarily consolidate their financial position, so that productive invest-
ment and employment creation usually lag far behind. Post-financial upswings, 
if they ever take place, are usually characterized by jobless, mild recoveries
characterized by depressed investment. Empirical evidence shows that over the 
entire (finance-driven) business cycle job destruction is deeper than (initial) job 
creation, and that growth rarely returns at pre-crisis levels even in East Asian 
miracle economies (see Akyüz, 2014; Chandrasekhar, 2013).
4. ENDOGENOUS FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY:
REFORM PROPOSAL FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
The response of emerging economies, in particular East Asian countries, to financial 
instability has taken the form of macroeconomic policies aimed at avoiding the 
emergence of new financial turbulences.
(1)  Several emerging/developing countries have adopted managed exchange rate
regimes in place of hard pegs. On the one hand, the former provide emerging
economies with more autonomy in the conduction of monetary policies. On
the other hand, managed exchange rate regimes leave central banks potentially
free to intervene on foreign currency markets when exchange rate dynamics
are inconsistent with the economic goals of domestic authorities. Since 1997,
East Asian countries have deliberately attempted to maintain a competitive and 
depreciated (real) exchange rate in order to avoid CA deficits.
(2)  Consistently with the previous point, the central banks of East Asian countries
(as well as, the central banks of many other developing countries) have accu-
mulated enormous amounts of foreign reserves. Of course, this is functional to
maintaining a depreciated exchange rate. Also, it constitutes a precautionary
stand against possible speculative attacks against domestic currencies.
(3)  In East Asian countries, “hyperactivism” on the foreign currency market has
been accompanied by a relatively tight monetary policy and extremely strin-
gent prudential regulation, which eventually cut available credit for domestic
investment (see Chandrasekhar, 2013, pp. 319, 320).
(4)  Fiscal policy has been generally restrictive. This is consistent with a more
general policy stance aimed at compressing domestic demand and putting
even more emphasis on export-led growth. This is why Chandrasekhar (2013)
describe the ensuing gap between domestic savings and investment as the result 
of an investment famine rather than a savings glut.
Deflationary policies certainly contributed to the relative anaemic growth records 
(with respect to the 1970s and 1980s) that even successful East Asian countries 
registered after 1997. This fact provides an additional good reason for the rein-
troduction of quantitative restrictions, and sometimes complete impediments, to 
certain capital flows, in order to open more space for autonomous expansionary 
policies. Nonetheless, restrictions to capital flows represent just a single piece, 
although important, of a more general reform strategy of the global governance 
of international financial markets, and of the world economy as a whole. This is 
due to the fact that the financialization of developed economies is endogenous to 
the evolution of capitalism, as are recurrent surges in capital flows to developing 
countries and the subsequent crises. Hence, a systemic approach to the issue of 
global finance and economic development is needed.
Arriola (2017) describes the financialization of developed countries as the conse-
quence of “the depletion of the sources of growth of relative surplus value (Arriola, 
2017, p. 33)”. Accordingly, the most recent financial crisis must be “analysed from 
the long-term trends that manifest themselves in the form of a structural crisis of 
capitalism. [It is] the symptom of the exhaustion of the procedures set up by US 
capital in the late 1970s and early 1980s to continue to attract material resources 
from all around the world (Arriola, 2017, pp. 32, 33)”. From the point of view of 
developing countries, recurrent surges in capital inflows take place when “periph-
eral” countries offer higher remuneration to global capital than advanced economies 
do. This often happens in connection with cheap money and abundant liquidity on 
international markets, and (post-crisis) economic stagnation in the “centre” of the 
global system. In the end, the financial turbulences of the last 40 years must stand 
out as endogenous components of the post-Bretton Woods era.
The financial order emerging out of the end of the Bretton Woods system is “the 
result of the US decision to deal with its balance of payments problems without 
any real adjustment of its economy (Arriola, 2017, p. 33)”. D’Arista and Erturk 
(2013) define such a regime as the “Unilateral Dollar Standard”. In this system, the 
US Dollar has become the international reserve currency without any remaining 
connection with gold. This has allowed the US trade deficit to become structural, 
and actually necessary to maintain global growth. Also, it has induced a restricted 
bunch of surplus economies, i.e. Germany, Japan and oil-exporting countries, to 
invest their surpluses in the US financial system. The US financial system has then 
recycled such capitals into developing economies, with the well-known conse-
quences in terms of heightened instability in the latter.
Such a triangulation has partially broken down after the outbreak of the East 
Asian crisis. Since then, East Asian countries have adopted quite restrictive policy 
stances in order to achieve large CA surpluses. Together with China, they have 
accumulated massive foreign reserves, as many other developing countries started 
to do thanks to capital inflows larger than CA deficits. Mounting reserve stocks in 
emerging economies mirrored the allocation of BoP surpluses in the US. Differently 
from the past, these funds have been mainly re-lodged in the US economy, fuelling 
the housing bubble and a household debt-led growth regime, rather than redirected 
towards developing economies. Nonetheless, such a different way of “recycling” 
international imbalances has equally led to the very same unstable outcomes.
Alongside with the above changes in the international financial architecture, also 
international economic institutions have significantly modified their modus oper-
andi. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF has increasingly 
addressed long-term development goals and poverty reduction. Long-run economic 
development has been pursued through the concession of financial support condi-
tional to the implementation of comprehensive structural reforms in the fields of trade, 
industrial, labour market, monetary and fiscal policy. The IMF has been increasingly 
involved in the resolution of financial crises. In doing this, the IMF’s loans have been 
used to maintain capital account convertibility and secure the reimbursement of for-
eign credits. Poor attention, if any, has been devoted to the financing of (temporary) 
CA imbalances and the support of economic activity, i.e. the IMF’s original tasks.
Akyüz (2014) proposes a rather radical reform of international economic gov-
ernance in order to address the existing structural CA imbalances, and to promote 
world-wide prosperity. His proposal is in turn consistent with the need to overcome 
the “Unilateral Dollar Standard” as emphasized by D’Arista and Erturk (2013); 
Ocampo (2013). A few points are worth mentioning.
(1)  The IMF should return to its primary (and original) goal, i.e. short-term financ-
ing of temporary CA imbalances. The IMF’s loans should act as a buffer against 
the volatility of private capital flows and possible trade shocks (say temporary
reductions in the prices of primary commodities). They should aim at main-
taining growth and employment, and avoid the correction of CA imbalances
through drops in economic activity and imports.
(2)  Long-term development and poverty reduction should be out of the scope of
the IMF. The financing of development policies is primary responsibility of
the World Bank. Accordingly, IMF loans should be totally delinked from any
structural conditionality. Conditionality on IMF loans, if any, should be related 
to the nature of the CA imbalances they address. Conditionalities on fiscal,
monetary and exchange rate policies should be imposed only in the case of CA
deficits due to excessive domestic absorption and expansionary policies. When 
CA deficits are the consequence of temporary shocks, IMF financing should
come with no conditionality. The financing of structural CA imbalances due to
the development needs of backward economies should be accommodated by
long-term loans conceded by development institutions, certainly not the IMF.
(3)  The IMF should not be engaged in the resolution of financial crises. Rather,
it should focus on their prevention by strengthening the surveillance of
 macroeconomic policies. In the past, the IMF performed very poorly as to
foreseeing and neutralizing upcoming crises in emerging economies. Also, it
wrongly interpreted them as uniquely due to unsustainable fiscal and mone-
tary policies, so that the austerity packages subsequently advised (or imposed)
simply made post-financial crisis recessions even deeper. In the future, the IMF 
should adopt a symmetric stand. It should recognize the role played by volatile 
financial capitals and by spill-over effects emanating from macroeconomic 
policies in developed countries as relevant factors behind financial crises in 
emerging economies.
(4)  Problems of debt overhang should actually be disciplined by ad-hoc interna-
tional regulations as happens at national level. In this sense, Ocampo (2013) put 
forward the institution of an international debt court. And Akyüz (2014) stresses 
how the rules regulating international debt crises should foresee temporary debt 
standstills and automatic rollovers to alleviate the costs of debt management
on the shoulder of debtor countries.
(5)  Finally, D’Arista and Erturk (2013); Ocampo (2013), and Akyüz (2014) support 
the idea of transforming Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in the new interna-
tional reserve currency in place of the US Dollar. The IMF, or a new interna-
tional monetary authority, should be responsible for issuing SDRs. Issuances
should be based on country needs rather than on quotas to the IMF. In their view, 
all these measures should aim at correcting existing external imbalances, but
at the same time create the condition for the adoption of expansionary stances.
On the one hand, developing countries would be allowed to downplay the cur-
rent overemphasis on the accumulation of foreign reserves, and abandon the
“obsession” for export-led growth regimes. Even further, international resources
could be increasingly deployed in developing countries to support productive
investment and development efforts, rather than being diverted towards the
US financial system. In the end, a much more equitable international mone-
tary system would emerge, closely similar to that originally thought by John
Maynard Keynes.
5. CONCLUSIONS
After decades of increasing financial liberalization, a quite widespread consensus is 
growing among economists that the opening of developing countries’ capital account 
to foreign capitals can seriously impinge on their own financial and macroeconomic 
stability. Thus, two different strategies have been proposed to avoid serial financial 
crises in the aftermath of financial liberalization. The first proposal is centred on 
a “single-country” approach. It simply requires each single economy to first adopt 
adequate micro-prudential regulations, and to appropriately liberalize other parts 
of the economy (the good and labour markets, for instance) before embarking on 
financial liberalization. The adoption of good institutions and high-quality govern-
ance would be enough to ensure the latter to be fruitful. The alternative heterodox 
perspective relies upon a “systemic approach”, according to which recurrent finan-
cial crises are endogenous consequences of the intrinsic dynamics of capitalistic 
economics, as well as of the normal functioning of financial markets. If so, what is 
needed is the implementation of constantly updated macro-prudential regulation, 
tight impediments to some form of capital flows, as well as a general reform of the 
existing asymmetric and biased (in favour of the interests of developed countries) 
international monetary system. In this sense, the Keynes’ original request for the 
institution of an International Clearing House and the introduction of the “Bancor” 
at the time of the Bretton Woods agreements still constitutes the perfect guide 
describing how world international institutions should evolve to secure financial 
stability and global shared prosperity.
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